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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
After a jury trial, Kirk Allen Huff was convicted of one count of attempted burglary.
He received a unified sentence of three years, with one year fixed. On appeal, Mr. Huff
contends that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that they must be
unanimous in their determination of which of the alleged acts Mr. Huff engaged in
constituted attempted burglary.

Mr. Huff further contends that there was insufficient

evidence to convict him of attempted burglary, and further contends that his aggregate
sentence represents an abuse of the district court's discretion, as it is excessive given
any view of the facts.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On January 25, 2012, Mr. Huff was observed standing in the alley near the back
of his neighbor's house. (Tr., p.82, Ls.8-10.) While in the alley, he picked up a piece of
wood approximately two feet long by four by four inches wide. (Tr., p.106, Ls.17-23,
p.112, Ls.17-19; State's Ex. 2.) It had several nails sticking out of it. (Tr., p.97, Ls.4-5.)
He then allegedly struck the board against the door of a utility trailer owned by Ward 4
of the Latter Day Saints church that was used for Boy Scout camp-outs. (Tr., p.100,
Ls.3-14.) The trailer was being stored by Mr. Huff's neighbor a few doors down, Chad
Nelson. (Tr., p.87, Ls.3-6, p.100, Ls.10-12.) Mr. Nelson observed what appeared to be
Mr. Huff hitting the trailer, confronted him, and then he watched Mr. Huff walk, then run,
away. (Tr., p.96, Ls.6-25, p.98, L.25 - p.99, L.15.) Mr. Huff was later found hiding in
some bushes in the alleyway. (Tr., p.101, Ls.2-12.) Mr. Huff appeared to be intoxicated
during the incident. (Tr., p.137, Ls.7-14.)
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Mr. Huff was charged by information with attempted burglary. (R., pp.32-33.)
At trial, the owner/caretaker of the trailer, Mr. Nelson, testified that around 8:00
p.m., one of his children came into his house and told him that there were two men
trying to break into his utility trailer parked at the back of his property. (Tr., p.82, L.8 p.83, L.1.) Mr. Nelson and his wife went outside to see if they could see the two men,
but there was nobody there. (Tr., p.83, Ls.1-4, p.88, Ls.1-8.) Mr. Nelson observed a
great amount of damage to the trailer-the two top corners of the door were destroyed,
as was the bottom left-hand corner and the left-hand locking mechanism was also
destroyed.

(Tr., p.83, Ls.10-13, p.86, Ls.19-23.)

The two men who purportedly

damaged the locking mechanism were not identified; however, during both his opening
and closing remarks the prosecutor referred to this incident.
During his opening argument, the prosecutor stated that he would be showing
the jury that Mr. Huff attempted to commit burglary using: the video and the damage to
the trailer, particularly to the padlock, the statements of Mr. Huff and the fact that he hid
in the bushes:
And so, again, the things we're going to show you in our argument that he
attempted to commit burglary are the video, the damage to the trailer,
particularly to the padlock. On that video you'll hear loud sounds. You'll
see a picture of the four-by-four, which is just two two-by-fours. The
statements that Mr. Huff makes and also the fact that he's hiding in the
bushes after the police get called.
(Trial Tr., p.74, Ls.3-10.)
In his closing argument, the prosecutor implied that it was Mr. Huff who initially
caused the damage to the locking mechanism:
So what the Defense is trying to suggest, that coincidentally some
unknown people caused the majority of this damage and then Mr. Huff
showed up soon thereafter and, unbeknownst to him, these other two
people had tried to break in and that he just thought, "I'm going to commit
some vandalism right now and commit this vandalism, and then I was
2

caught." What a coincidence. We have these two unknown burglars in the
area at the same time Mr. Huff was trying to just vandalize the lock of the
trailer. That is not reasonable to believe that. So rely on your common
sense in making this decision. That's what it means to - that's what
reasonable doubt's all about is that common sense.
(Tr., p.175, Ls.3-16.)
The jury was instructed on the elements of attempted burglary:
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Attempted Burglary, the state
must prove each of the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.

On or about July 25, 2012
in the state of Idaho
the defendant Kirk Huff did some act which was a step
towards committing the crime of burglary, and
at the time of said act, the defendant had the specific intent
to commit the crime of theft.

If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant guilty.
(Jury Instruction No. 21, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on August 14, 2013.)
The jury found Mr. Huff guilty of attempted burglary. (R., p.71) The district court
imposed a unified sentence of three years, with one year determinate and retained
jurisdiction over Mr. Huff. (Tr., p.186, Ls.19-25; R., pp.76-78.) Mr. Huff appeals from
the judgment of conviction. 1 (R., pp.80-83.)

1

Mr. Huff also filed a Rule 35 motion, seeking leniency, which was denied by the district
court. (Motion to Reduce Sentence, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on
August 14, 2013; Minute Entry denying Rule 35 motion, attached to the Motion to
Augment filed on August 14, 2013.) In light of the relevant standards of review, Mr. Huff
does not raise the issue of the district court's denial of his Rule 35 motion in this appeal.
3

ISSUES

1.

Did the district court err by failing to instruct the jury on unanimity?

2.

Was there substantial competent evidence to support Mr. Huff's conviction for
attempted burglary?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of
three years, with one year fixed, upon Mr. Huff following his conviction for
attempted burglary?

4

ARGUMENT

I.
The District Court Denied Mr. Huff His Constitutional And Statutory Rights To A
Unanimous Jury Verdict When It Failed To Give The Jury A Unanimity Instruction

A.

Introduction

Some members of the jury could have found that the act of hitting the locking
mechanism was committed by Mr. Huff and constituted the attempt, while other
members of the jury may have felt that Mr. Huff's act of picking up the piece of wood
was an attempt. Ultimately, Mr. Huff could have been convicted of attempted burglary
either by the actions of the two unknown individuals in the alley who damaged the
latching mechanisms on the trailer, or by the act of picking up the board and/or by
hitting the trailer with the board or perhaps even by hiding in the bushes that night.
Jurors in Idaho must unanimously agree on a guilty verdict. Under the facts and
circumstances of this case, the district court was required to instruct the jurors that they
must unanimously agree on which act or acts constituted the attempted burglary.

In

failing to give the obligatory unanimity instruction, the district court denied Mr. Huff's
constitutional and statutory rights to a unanimous verdict, thereby committing both
reversible and fundamental error.
The jury was instructed on the elements of attempted burglary - the jury was
instructed that the State must prove, inter alia, that "the defendant Kirk Huff did some

act which was a step towards committing the crime of burglary, and at the time of said
act, the defendant had the specific intent to commit the crime of theft." 2 (Jury Instruction

2

Jury Instruction No. 21 provided:
5

No. 21, attached to the Motion to Augment the Record, filed on August 14, 2013
(emphasis added).) Because the jury was informed that it need only find that Mr. Huff
committed "some act" and that at the time of "said act, the defendant has the specific
intent to commit the crime of theft", the district court failed to protect jury unanimity
because where the jury was never instructed as to which act alleged by the State
constituted the attempted burglary, the district court was therefore required to instruct
the jurors that they must unanimously agree on which of the alleged acts constituted the
alleged attempted burglary. This Court should vacate Mr. Huff's conviction.

8.

Because Separate And Distinct Incidents Of Criminal Conduct Could Provide A
Basis For The Jurors' Finding Of Guilt On The Attempted Burglary Charge, The
Trial Court Erred When It Failed To Instruct The Jury That It Must Unanimously
Agree On The Specific Incident Constituting The Offense
Jurors must be instructed on all of the matters of law necessary for their

consideration, including "instructions on rules of law that are 'material to the
determination of a defendant's guilt or innocence."' State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,
710 (2009) (citing I.C. § 19-2132 and quoting State v. Mack, 132 Idaho 480, 483
(Ct. App. 1999)).

Idaho law requires a trial court to instruct the jury that they must

unanimously agree on the defendant's guilt in order for the defendant to be convicted.

In order for the defendant to be guilty of Attempted Burglary, the state
must prove each of the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.

On or about July 25, 2012
in the state of Idaho
the defendant Kirk Huff did some act which was a step
towards committing the crime of burglary, and
at the time of said act, the defendant had the specific intent
to commit the crime of theft.

If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.
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Id. at 711 (citing Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 267-268 (Ct. App. 2000).) In order to

preserve the right to a unanimous jury verdict, a unanimity instruction must be given
"when it appears that there is a genuine possibility of jury confusion or that a conviction
may occur as the result of different jurors concluding that the defendant committed
different acts." State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 172 (Ct. App. 2004).
Where the evidence indicates that separate and distinct incidents of
criminal conduct could provide a basis for a juror's finding of guilt on the
criminal charge in any count, the trial court must instruct the jury that it
must unanimously agree on the specific incident constituting the offense in
each count. ...
Id. at 172-73.

"A unanimity instruction is used to tell the jury that they must find a

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on a single agreed upon incident,
thus ensuring the defendant has a unanimous jury verdict."

State v. Montoya, 140

Idaho 160, 167 (Ct. App. 2004).
However, "[a]n instruction that the jury must unanimously agree on the facts
giving rise to the offense ... is generally not required."

Id. There is an important

exception to this general principle "when a defendant commits several acts, each of
which would independently support a conviction for the crime charged." Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court distinguished the facts in State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho
970, 977 (2008), from the line of cases in which the Idaho Court of Appeals held that
when "several distinct criminal acts support one count, jury unanimity must be protected
by the state's election of the act upon which it will rely for conviction or by a clarifying
instruction requiring the jurors to unanimously agree that the same underlying criminal
act has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Johnson, 145 Idaho at 977 (quoting
Gain, 140 Idaho at 173 (emphasis in original).) The Johnson Court distinguished the

facts in Johnson from those in cases such as Gain, 140 Idaho 170, Montoya, 140 Idaho
7

at 167-168; Miller, 135 Idaho at 267-268, finding that in Johnson, there was no evidence
of more criminal acts that had not been charged. Id. In Johnson, only one criminal act
was charged-first-degree murder-and no evidence was presented of additional
criminal acts. Id.
Similarly, in Severson, the defendant was alleged to have murdered his wife by
alternative means - either by suffocating her or by poisoning her. Severson, at 701.
The defendant argued that the district court was required to instruct the jury that they
must be unanimous in determining the means by which he allegedly committed the
murder. Id. at 710. In rejecting Severson's argument, the Idaho Supreme Court found
"the trial court in this case was not required to instruct the jury that it must unanimously
agree on the means by which Severson killed his wife" because he "was charged with
the single act of murdering his wife." Id. at 712. Furthermore, the Court reasoned,
Although the evidence showed that Severson could have murdered his
wife by either overdosing her or suffocating her, it did not indicate that
separate incidents involving distinct unions of mens rea and actus reus
occurred. The very nature of the crime of murder eliminates this
possibility. Absent evidence of more than one instance in which Severson
engaged in the charged conduct, the jury was not required to unanimously
agree on the facts giving rise to the offense.
Id. The Court recognized that the defendant could not be convicted of the single charge

of murdering his wife on more than one occasion; thus, the district court did not err by
failing to give a unanimity instruction. Id.
However, Idaho Courts have long recognized that a unanimity instruction is
necessary where separate crimes, requiring proof of distinct unions of mens rea and
actus reus, are alleged, even where the separate crimes are alleged in one count. The
ultimate question is whether each alleged incident was part of a single course of
conduct. State v. Major, 111 Idaho 410, 414 (1986). As the Major Court noted, the
8

distinction between whether a course of conduct constitutes one or multiple offense is
important as,
to charge a defendant with two offenses when only one was committed
violates the defendant's right against double jeopardy, U.S. Const. amend.
V, Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13; conversely, to charge a defendant with one
offense when more than one was committed can prejudice the defendant
"in the shaping of evidentiary rulings, in producing a conviction on less
than a unanimous verdict as to each separate offense, in sentencing, in
limiting review on appeal, and in exposing the defendant to double
jeopardy." Criminal Procedure, § 19.2(e), p. 457.

Id. (emphasis added).
In Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261 (Ct. App. 2000), the Idaho Court of appeals held
that the "act or acts" language contained in Idaho Code § 18-1508 ("Lewd conduct with
a minor child under sixteen"), does not "allow for a continuing course of conduct
element.

Rather, the legislature's use of the plural is a recognition that a series of

sexual contacts by different means which occur as a part of a single incident, i.e., a
continuous transaction without significant breaks, are to be charged as a single count of
lewd conduct." Id. at 266. Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the Miller Court
found that the defendant was alleged to have committed six separate acts of manual to
genital contact and that trial counsel was deficient in failing to request a unanimity
instruction (although the court found there was no prejudice). Id. at 267-269.
Furthermore, in State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 33-34 (1997), the Idaho Supreme
Court rejected the defendant's argument that his double jeopardy rights were violated
based upon his being charged with and convicted of both lewd conduct and infamous
crime against nature, as each act of fellatio performed on the victim were separate and
distinct. The Court found,
The first sexual assault took place on J.S.'s bed. The second assault took
place on J.S.'s couch. The amended information clearly required proof of
these different facts. Further, other events occurred in between these acts
9

of sexual assault. After the first assault, J.S. was pulled off the bed and
thrown onto the couch where Bush told J.S. he wanted J.S. to engage in
fellatio. J.S. refused and was pushed to his knees and Bush tied a t-shirt
around J.S.'s face. Bush again placed J.S. on the couch and tied his arms
behind his back with a cord. It was after these events that the second act
of sexual assault occurred. Bush then again placed J.S.'s penis in his
mouth for five to ten minutes. These facts appear to demonstrate that
there were two separate and distinct sexual assaults committed on J.S.

Id. at 34.

Similarly, in State v. Grinolds, 121 Idaho 673 (1992), the Court found no

double jeopardy violation where the defendant was convicted of two counts of rape, as
the evidence showed that despite the fact that each act occurred in the same bedroom,
the defendant left the bedroom between each act and jury was properly instructed they
had to consider each alleged act separately. Id. at 675.
Thus, while Idaho law does not generally require jury unanimity of the underlying
facts supporting an element of the crime, where a crime is alleged to have been
committed by alternative means and where the defendant is alleged to have committed
separate and distinct criminal acts, Idaho law requires unanimity even if the acts are
alleged in a single count.
Here, Mr. Huff was charged with one count of attempted burglary. (R., pp.60-61.)
The jury instruction which set forth the elements of an attempt told the jury that it need
only find that Mr. Huff did "some act;" however, the jury was never instructed what that
actwas.

(Jury Instruction No. 21, attached to the Motion to Augment the Record, filed

on August 14, 2013.) Thus, faced with this ambiguity, the jury was essentially free to
find that any act of Mr. Huff's constituted an attempt, and further there was no
requirement that they had to agree what that act was.
Even the opening and closing statements by the State did not clarify what act the
State was trying to prove constituted an attempt.

During his opening argument, the

prosecutor stated that he would be showing the jury that Mr. Huff attempted to commit
10

burglary using: the video and the damage to the trailer, particularly to the padlock, the
statements of Mr. Huff and the fact that he hid in the bushes:
And so, again, the things we're going to show you in our argument that he
attempted to commit burglary are the video, the damage to the trailer,
particularly to the padlock. On that video you'll hear loud sounds. You'll
see a picture of the four-by-four, which is just two two-by-fours. The
statements that Mr. Huff makes and also the fact that he's hiding in the
bushes after the police get called.
(Trial Tr., p.74, Ls.3-10.) Thus the State listed several acts which could possibly have
constituted an attempt. The jurors could possibly have found any one of these acts
constituted an attempt. The district court failed to identify which act it was asking the
jury to find was or was not an attempt.
Further, there was also testimony and evidence admitted that the trailer had
previously been damaged, prior to Mr. Nelson's observations of Mr. Huff, including
damage to the locking mechanisms of the trailer. Mr. Nelson testified that he observed
damage to the locking mechanisms by two unknown persons before he allegedly saw
Mr. Huff pick up the piece of wood and presumably hit the back of the trailer with it.
(Tr., 83, Ls.10-13, p.86, Ls.19-23.) In his closing argument, the prosecutor implied that
it was Mr. Huff who initially caused the damage to the locking mechanism:
So what the Defense is trying to suggest, that coincidentally some
unknown people caused the majority of this damage and then Mr. Huff
showed up soon thereafter and, unbeknownst to him, these other two
people had tried to break in and that he just thought, "I'm going to commit
some vandalism right now and commit this vandalism, and then I was
caught." What a coincidence. We have these two unknown burglars in the
area at the same time Mr. Huff was trying to just vandalize the lock of the
trailer. That is not reasonable to believe that. So rely on your common
sense in making this decision. That's what it means to - that's what
reasonable doubt's all about is that common sense.
(Tr., p.175, Ls.3-16.)
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Some members of the jury could have found that the act of hitting the locking
mechanism was committed by Mr. Huff and constituted the attempt, while other
members of the jury may have felt that Mr. Huff's act of picking up the piece of wood
was an attempt. Ultimately, Mr. Huff could have been convicted of attempted burglary
either by the actions of the two unknown individuals in the alley who damaged the
latching mechanisms on the trailer, or by the act of picking up the board and/or by
hitting the trailer with the board or perhaps even by hiding in the bushes that night.
This is not the unanimous jury verdict contemplated by the Idaho Constitution, 3
I.C. §§ 19-2316 and 19-2317 and Idaho Criminal Rule 31. See Montoya, 140 Idaho at
167 (requiring a finding of the "defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on a
single agreed upon incident. ... "); Gain, 140 Idaho at 173 (requiring the jury to
unanimously agree "on the specific incident constituting the offense in each count.")
Miller, 135 Idaho at 268 (holding that defendant was entitled to an instruction requiring

that the jury find him guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of a single agreed upon
incident). Because separate and distinct incidents of criminal conduct in this case could
provide a basis for the jurors' finding of guilt on the criminal charges of attempted
burglary, the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury that it must unanimously
agree on the specific incident constituting the offense.

In Idaho, in all criminal cases, the jury's verdict must be a unanimous verdict. See
I.C. §§ 19-2316, 19-2317, Idaho Criminal Rule 31. Furthermore, the Idaho Constitution
provides that in a felony criminal trial a jury's verdict must be unanimous. See IDAHO
CONST. art. I, §7. Although section seven does not specifically state that felony trials
require a unanimous verdict, that conclusion is inescapable from the provision's
language. "The right of a trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but in civil actions, threefourths of the jury may render a verdict, and the legislature may provide that in all cases
of misdemeanors five-sixths of the jury may render a verdict." Id. By failing to provide
for less than a unanimous verdict in felony cases, but providing for such in other types
of cases, the Idaho constitution guarantees the right to a unanimous jury verdict in all
felony criminal cases.
12
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Thus it is impossible to tell whether the jury reached a unanimous verdict on any
of the separate and distinct acts that could potentially constitute an attempt to
burglarize. Because it is impossible to tell whether the jury correctly reached its verdict
unanimously, or incorrectly reached its verdict based upon divergent theories, this Court
must vacate the conviction and remand the case for a new trial. See State v. Luke, 134
Idaho 294, 301 (2000).

C.

The District Court's Failure To Give A Necessary Jury Instruction Is Fundamental
Error
Mr. Huff acknowledges that no objection was made to the omitted jury instruction

on unanimity.

Therefore, the claim raised is one of fundamental error.

The Idaho

Supreme Court has set forth the standard of appellate review of unobjected-to error.
See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). Under the three-part test for fundamental

error as set forth in Perry, a defendant must demonstrate that: 1) one or more of his
unwaived constitutional rights were violated; 2) there was a clear and obvious error
without the need for additional information not contained in the appellate record; and 3)
the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning that there is a reasonable
probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.

Id. at 226.

Mr. Huff meets all the prongs of this test.
First, the alleged error is a violation of Mr. Huff's right to a unanimous jury verdict
and right to be free from double jeopardy. The right to a unanimous jury verdict in a
felony criminal trial is so fundamental to the citizens of Idaho that it has been expressed
in both the constitution and in statutes. See IDAHO CONST. art. I, §7, I.C. §§ 19-2316,
19-2317 and Idaho Criminal Rule 31.
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The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury .... " Similarly, Article I, section 7 of the Idaho Constitution provides, 'The
right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate .... " Idaho Const. art. I, § 7. This section
"guarantee[s] the right to a trial by jury, which means a jury which has not been mislead
by erroneous instructions to a defendant's prejudice .... " State v. Taylor, 59 Idaho 724,
, 87 P.2d 454, 460 (1939). See also Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748
(1948) (Unanimity in jury verdicts is required where the Sixth and Seventh Amendments
apply, "In criminal cases this requirement of unanimity extends to all issues-character
or degree of the crime, guilt and punishment-which are left to the jury.").
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment is the constitutional
guarantee protecting a defendant against multiple punishments for the same offense,
and is the right implicated when a unanimity instruction is at issue.

U.S. CONST.

amend. V. In State v. Major, the Idaho Supreme Court held that charging a defendant
with one crime when more were in fact committed exposes the defendant to double
jeopardy:
Whether a course of conduct constitutes one offense or several can be a
troublesome question. The distinction is important: to charge a defendant
with two offenses when only one was committed violates the defendant's
right against double jeopardy, U.S. Const.amend. V, Idaho Const. art. 1, §
13; conversely, to charge a defendant with one offense when more than
one was committed can prejudice the defendant "in the shaping of
evidentiary rulings, in producing a conviction on less than a unanimous
verdict as to each separate offense, in sentencing, in limiting review on
appeal, and in exposing the defendant to double jeopardy." Criminal
Procedure, § 19.2(e), p. 457.
State v. Major, 111 Idaho 410, 414 (1986) (holding that a new trial was necessary as it

was impossible to determine whether the jury convicted the defendant solely on the
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basis of the alleged possession on the reservation, or for both alleged possessions
occurring both on and off the reservation where there was no unanimity instruction).
Here, the jurors could reasonably have concluded that they were directed to find
Mr. Huff guilty of attempted burglary if they found that he performed any of a variety of
acts which could each constitute the crime of attempt. The jurors were not instructed as
to what theory of liability the State was proceeding on-that is, what act or acts the
State alleged constituted attempted burglary, nor was the jury instructed that they must
unanimously agree on what act constituted an attempted burglary.

Such an

interpretation misled the jury and deprived Mr. Huff of his right to a unanimous verdict
and implicated his right to be free from double jeopardy; thus, the jury instructions in this
case were unconstitutional.

The error implicates Mr. Huff's unwaived constitutional

rights.
Second, the error is clear and obvious from the record. The law is clear that a
defendant as a right to a unanimous verdict.

The Double Jeopardy Clause clearly

prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense, providing that no person shall "be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."

The jury

instructions are in the record, so there is no need for additional information outside the
record. Further, there is no evidence that the failure to object to the instruction was a
strategic decision, as Mr. Huff gained absolutely no strategic advantage by giving the
jury an opportunity to convict him of "an act" which could include any of the following:
the damage to the locking mechanism of the trailer by unknown persons in the alley
earlier that day, loitering near the trailer, holding a piece of wood with a nail in it, hitting
the trailer with the piece of wood, or hiding in some bushes.

Further, trial counsel

strenuously argued in his closing remarks to the jury that none of the acts Mr. Huff was
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alleged to have committed constituted attempted burglary.

(Tr., p.168, L.6 - p.172,

L.24.)
Third, there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings. While the jury heard evidence that Mr. Nelson saw Mr. Huff's feet and
heard noises in the direction of the trailer (Trial Tr., p.145, Ls.20-23), the jury also heard
evidence that the damage to the locking mechanisms of the trailer was present prior to
Mr. Nelson confronting Mr. Huff at the trailer, and had possibly been done earlier that
day, by two unknown persons.

(Tr., p.111, Ls.3-9.)

Even the prosecutor alternated

between differing theories as to what act constituted attempted burglary, and ultimately
failed to clarify which act the jury should find was an attempt. Thus, due to the lack of a
unanimity jury instruction, the jury was misled as it was left with the impression that it
could convict Mr. Huff if it found that he committed any of a various litany of acts. There
was no instruction that the jurors agree as to what act or acts constituted the attempt.
Because the failure of the district court to give the jury this instruction violated
Mr. Huff's right to a unanimous verdict and right to be free from double jeopardy, and
because he meets all three prongs of Idaho's fundamental error test, Mr. Huff's
conviction must be vacated.

11.
The State Failed To Present Substantial, Competent Evidence To Support
Mr. Huff's Conviction For Attempted Burglary
The State failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove Mr. Huff guilty of
attempted burglary because it failed to prove that he attempted to enter the trailer with
the intent to commit theft. An appellate court's review of the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a conviction is limited in scope.
16

State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104

(Ct. App. 2001).

The reviewing court will not set aside the judgment of conviction

following a jury verdict, if "there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of
fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592,
594 (Ct. App. 1997).
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court will conduct an
independent review of the evidence in the record to determine whether a reasonable
mind could conclude that each material element of the offense was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Willard, 129 Idaho 827, 828 (Ct. App. 1997); Knutson, 121
Idaho at 104.

The Court will not substitute its views for that of the jury when

determining "the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and
the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence." Crawford, 130 Idaho at 595.
Furthermore, the Court will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution. Id. In State v. Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134 (Ct. App. 1997), it was noted that,
"[e]vidence is regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and
rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proved." Id. at 135.
The attempt statute, Idaho Code § 18-306, provides that "[e]very person who
attempts to commit any crime, but fails, or is prevented or intercepted in the perpetration
thereof" is subject to punishment for an attempted commission of that crime.
Idaho courts have held that an attempt consists of two elements: (1) an intent to
do an act or bring about certain consequences which would in law amount to a crime,
and (2) an act in furtherance of that intent which goes beyond mere preparation. See
State v Otto, 102 Idaho 250, 251 (1981); State v. Fabeny, 132 Idaho 917, 923 (Ct. App.

1999). The preparatory phase of a crime consists of "devising or arranging the means
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or measures necessary for the commission of the offense." Otto, 102 Idaho at 251
(quoting Perkins, Criminal Law 557 (2d ed.1969)). "To go beyond mere preparation, the
actions of the defendant must reach far enough toward the accomplishment of the
desired result to amount to the commencement of the consummation of the crime."
State v. Glass, 139 Idaho 815, 818 (Ct. App. 2003) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).
"The intent of the accused is a question of fact for the jury to determine. Direct
evidence as to intent is not required.

A jury may infer intent from the commission of

acts and the surrounding circumstances." State v. Marsh, 141 Idaho 862, 867 (Ct. App.
2004) (citations omitted); State v. Nastoff, 124 Idaho 667, 671 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that there was no substantial evidence in the record upon which the jury could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally started the fire).
Here, the State failed to prove that Mr. Huff had the requisite intent to take
something from the trailer.

It is the responsibility of the parties to ensure that their

respective positions and arguments are in the record for appellate review. See State v.
Allen, 143 Idaho 267 (Ct. App. 2006) ("An appellate court can know only what is

revealed on the record and it is therefore incumbent upon the respective attorneys to
clearly and unambiguously state the entire plea agreement on the record.")
Mr. Huff asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for
attempted burglary, because there was no substantial evidence that would have proven
the essential element of intent beyond a reasonable doubt. There was no evidence or
testimony at trial that Mr. Huff was trying to enter the trailer, and further, there was no
evidence that Mr. Huff intended to commit the crime of theft.

There was simply no

evidence or testimony at all that Mr. Huff intended to commit theft Although intent can
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be inferred, there was no evidence that Mr. Huff was trying to enter the trailer at all.
Mr. Nelson testified that he had observed what he thought was Mr. Huff twice hitting the
trailer with a piece of wood. No juror could then have found beyond a reasonable doubt
that there existed substantial evidence that Mr. Huff was trying to enter the trailer to take
whatever was inside the trailer.
Even if the jury disbelieved Mr. Huff's explanation to Mr. Nelson that he was
trying to break the nails off of the piece of wood by striking it against the trailer
(Tr., p.97, Ls.1-6), there was still no evidence or testimony as to what he was trying to
do.

He was an intoxicated man striking a trailer with a piece of wood.

It was not

reasonable to infer that he was trying to break into the trailer to steal something.
Ultimately there was absolutely no evidence that Mr. Huff was attempting to enter
the trailer, and there was no evidence that he was trying to enter the trailer for the
purpose of taking what was inside the trailer. At most, Mr. Huff was intending to commit
malicious injury to property, although there was no testimony or evidence that his
actions actually inflicted harm on the trailer.

Instead, there was an appalling lack of

evidence that Mr. Huff was actually trying to get into the trailer. Further, there was no
basis for the jury to infer that he intended to take anything from the trailer, once he
gained access. There were no such facts or evidence submitted at trial. No statement
by Mr. Huff as to his intent was ever admitted, no evidence, circumstantial or direct, was
ever introduced that his intent in striking the trailer with a piece of wood was anything
other than what he told Mr. Nelson-that the was trying to get the nails out of the wood.
Thus Mr. Huff's conviction for attempted burglary cannot be upheld.
The record contains no evidence that Mr. Huff was trying to inflict damage to the
locking mechanism of the trailer, there was no evidence that Mr. Huff was trying to gain
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access to the trailer, and therefore the jury could not reasonably infer that he was trying
to enter the trailer to commit the crime of theft. Thus, insufficient evidence exists to
support his conviction for attempted burglary.

111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Aggregate Sentence Of
Three Years, With One Year Fixed, Upon Mr. Huff Following His Conviction For
Attempted Burglary
Mr. Huff asserts that, given any view of the facts, his aggregate sentence of
three years, with one year fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."'

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Huff does not allege that his
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of

discretion, Mr. Huff must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of
criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution
for wrongdoing. Id.
In light of Mr. Huff's rehabilitative potential, the district court abused its discretion
in retaining jurisdiction over Mr. Huff instead of placing him on probation. The district
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court failed to consider the fact that Mr. Huff was aware of his alcohol problem, was
interested in seeking treatment for his addiction, and that, with programming, Mr. Huff
could likely be successful in the community.

(Presentence Investigation Report

(hereinafter, PSI), pp.17-18.)

Mr. Huff has not had an easy life.

He began drinking alcohol and using

marijuana at age twelve, and his childhood included exposure to physical abuse,
instability, and a great deal of family alcohol abuse.

(PSI, p.11, 16, 18.)

Mr. Huff

reported that his mother and his grandparents drank a lot and he and his siblings would
steal their alcohol and drink it. 4 (PSI, p.11.)
Mr. Huff has a good work history. He was regularly employed as a cook prior to
his incarceration. (PSI, p.14.) Idaho recognizes that good employment history should
be considered a mitigating factor. See State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982); see a/so
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982).

Another consideration that should have received the attention of the district court
is the fact that Mr. Huff has strong support from his family members.

See State v.

Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who had the

support of his family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts). Mr. Huff has a long-time
girlfriend, Linda Hurt, who he has been with for over five years. (PSI, p.12.) They "take
care of each other." (PSI, p.12.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that military service is considered a
mitigating factor at sentencing.

In Nice, the Court found the defendant's honorable

discharge from the military to be a factor in mitigation of sentence. State v. Nice, 103

Mr. Huff's grandparents helped raise him and his siblings as his father left the family
when he was approximately three months old. (PSI, p.11.)
4

21

Idaho 89, 90 (1982). Mr. Huff is a veteran of the U.S. Army, where he served for two
years and was honorably discharged. (PSI, p.13.)
Mr. Huff has serious medical problems.

Mr. Huff's medical problems are so

serious, that he was taken to the emergency room during his trial. (Tr., p.53, Ls.4-7.)
Mr. Huff suffers from ulcers and tumors in his colon, and takes four medications several
times daily, including hydrocodone for pain. (PSI, p.15.) Mr. Huff also suffers from a
traumatic brain injury and foot pain after his right foot was crushed in an accident. (PSI,
p.15.)
Mr. Huff has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and multiple traumatic brain
injuries. (PSI, p.15.) The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 192523 requires the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing
factor.

Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).

While Mr. Huff was previously

taking medications to manage his mental health conditions, he ceased taking the
medications in 2011.

(PSI, p.15.) Mr. Huff still suffers from mood swings and does

believe that he is in need of a mental health evaluation.

(PSI, p.15.)

Even the

presentence investigator concluded that Mr. Huff would benefit from mental health
evaluation.

(PSI, p.19.) The presentence investigator noted that Mr. Huff was also

diagnosed with depression during his substance abuse evaluation. (PSI, p.19.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered
as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v.
Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982).

In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence

based on Nice's lack of prior record and the fact that "the trial court did not give proper
consideration of the defendant's alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing the
defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem."
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Id. at 91. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that ingestion of drugs and

alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct, could be a
mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 (1981). Mr. Huff began
drinking alcohol around the age of 12 years old and drinks all day, every day. (PSI,
p.16.)

Mr. Huff becomes intoxicated almost every time he drinks.

(PSI, p.16.)

However, Mr. Huff realizes that he is in need of a drug and alcohol treatment program.
(PSI, p.17.) He is aware that his drug and alcohol use has caused him problems with
the law, his family, his employment and his health. (PSI, p.17.) Mr. Huff wants to turn
his life around. (PSI, p.17.) Mr. Huff is a severe alcoholic who is physically dependent
on alcohol, thus he will require stabilization of his co-occurring severe bio-medical
conditions and severe withdrawal problems. 5 (PSI, p.17.) Mr. Huff is hopeful for the
future-his goals are to stop drinking, get healthier, and get his life back. (PSI, p.18.)
Further, Mr. Huff expressed remorse for his acts.

Mr. Huff, in his PSI

Questionnaire, wrote that he felt "stupid" for the attempted burglary incident.

(PSI,

p.18.) He also wanted the court to know that he realized that he had a drinking problem
and that he wanted to receive help for his drinking problem as well as his health
problems.

(PSI, p.18.)

Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a

defendant expresses remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts.
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982); State v. Alberls, 121 Idaho 204, 209
(Ct. App. 1991 ). For example, in Alberls, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that some
leniency is required when the defendant has expressed "remorse for his conduct, his
recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other positive

Mr. Huff is so physically dependent on alcohol that his treating physician prescribed
him a beer. (PSI, pp.17, 42.)

5
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attributes of his character." Alberts, 121 Idaho at 209.

In Shideler, Idaho Supreme

Court ruled that the prospect of Shideler's recovery from his poor mental and physical
health, which included mood swings, violent outbursts, and drug abuse, coupled with his
remorse for his actions, was so compelling that it outweighed the gravity of the crimes of
armed robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a crime.

Shideler, 103 Idaho at 594-95. Therefore, the court reduced

Shideler's sentence from an indeterminate term not to exceed twenty years to an
indeterminate term not to exceed twelve years. Id. at 593.
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Huff asserts that the district court
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts that
had the district court properly considered his family support, work history, and remorse,
it would have placed him on probation.

Alternatively, the district court should have

imposed a less severe sentence.
CONCLUSION

Mr. Huff respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for attempted
burglary and remand that case for a new trial. Alternatively, he requests that this Court
reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate or remand his case to the district court for
a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 20 th day of September, 2013.

ublic Defender

24

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20 th day of September, 2013, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
KIRK ALLEN HUFF
INMATE #105978
NICI
236 RADAR RD
COTTONWOOD ID 83522
JOEL E TINGEY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
JOHN THOMAS
ATTORNEY AT LAW
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court.

E~:=S=:~~~

Administrative Assistant

SJC/eas

25

